The debt position of the state governments in India, which deteriorated sharply between 1997-98 and 2003-04, has 
I. Introduction
In line with an overall decentralizing trend, the sub-national governments worldwide have been entrusted with increasing responsibilities towards delivery of public goods and services, and investment in physical and social infrastructure. As the concomitant expenditure requirements generally fall short of own revenue receipts and inter-governmental transfers from the national authorities, the sub-national governments have to depend on borrowed resources to finance such expenditure. However, the borrowing limits of sub-national governments in various countries are subject to either regulatory restrictions or self-imposed fiscal discipline, given the underlying requirement to ensure debt sustainability at the subnational level.
In India, the state governments have been playing an important role in discharging various functions assigned to them under the Constitution. As the non-debt receipts of states are often not sufficient to provide the requisite financial resources, they resort to borrowings to meet various development needs. It is often said that borrowing per se is not bad provided it is used for productive purposes. While this may be a desirable goal, the actual utilisation of borrowed resources may not necessarily be only for productive purposes due to various reasons. However, the accumulation of debt liabilities, if left uncontrolled, could cause macroeconomic and financial stability issues. It is against the above backdrop that this paper assesses the issue of debt sustainability of states in India. The debt-sustainability analysis carried out in this paper is based on three approaches: indicator-based analysis, estimation of both inter-temporal budget constraint and fiscal policy response function (to deterioration in debt position) at the state level. While the debt sustainability analysis per se is in respect of debt stock or outstanding liabilities of the state governments, this has been extended to highlight the fiscal implications of off-budget items, viz., contingent liabilities of states, guarantees extended by them to state power utilities and finally the take-over of debt liabilities of these utilities by the state governments that have decided to participate in the restructuring scheme implemented by the Central government.
The paper is organised as follows. Section II defines debt sustainability. Section III presents a brief overview of various studies that have examined debt sustainability at the state level in the Indian context. An analytical presentation of the theoretical basis underlying fiscal/debt sustainability analysis is provided in Section IV. Some stylised facts relating to the evolution of state government debt in India are presented in Section V. Section VI presents an empirical assessment of debt sustainability at the state level based on different approaches.
The rationale for extending the conventional debt sustainability analysis to include off-budget fiscal position of states in the context of additional debt liabilities which have arisen on account of take-over of debt of state power utilities is explained in Section VII. The concluding observations are covered in Section VIII.
II. Defining Debt Sustainability
Sustainability is a term that has been used with increasing frequency in the academic literature and multilateral policy discussions, but with different connotations under different circumstances (Balassone and Franco, 2000; Chalk and Hemming, 2000) . How one defines debt sustainability could affect the conclusion one arrives about the sustainability or otherwise of debt in an economy. In the pioneering work on debt sustainability, based on the post-Second World War US data, Domar (1944) pointed out that primary deficit path can be sustained as long as real growth of the economy remains higher than the real interest rate. Buiter (1985) suggested that sustainable fiscal policy is one that is capable of keeping the public sector net worth to output ratio at its current level. Blanchard (1990) provided two conditions for sustainability viz., a) the ratio of debt to GNP should eventually converge back to its initial level, and b) the present discounted value of the ratio of primary surpluses to GNP should be equal to the current level of debt to GNP. Buiter (1985) , Blanchard (1990) , and Blanchard and others (1990) considered debt level as sustainable if a country's debt to GDP ratio remains stable, and if the economy generates debt stabilising primary balance to cover that debt in future.
In terms of the standard definition of fiscal sustainability, the ratio of outstanding debt and debt servicing to GDP, in a steady state, should not increase over time (World Bank and IMF, 2010) . The focus in this approach is on stabilising the debt-to-GDP ratio. IMF (2011) considers a set of fiscal policies as sustainable in case a borrower is able to continue servicing its debt without an unrealistic large future correction to its income and expenditure.
Typically, conventional debt sustainability analysis is an accounting-based approach linked to the inter-temporal budget constraint as follows: which states that public debt at the beginning of the period t+1 i.e., (Bt+1) equals past period debt including interest payments but adjusted for primary balance, depending on whether there is primary surplus or deficit. Recursively solving (1) with time period (t) starting at 0 and extending up to infinity, we get
Fiscal policy is said to be sustainable, if the initial stock of debt is equal to the sum of present discounted value of primary surpluses. Alternatively, the present value of revenues must be equal to the present value of spending including interest on the public debt plus repayment of the debt itself. This is defined as the inter-temporal budget constraint and is satisfied if the discounted sum of end-period debt converges to zero, i.e., Lim bt/(1+r) t becomes 0. This transversality condition rules out a 'Ponzi' scheme and requires that debt
should not grow at a rate faster than interest rate. The solvency condition for government debt implies that future budget surpluses would be sufficient to meet current debt liabilities.
The transversality condition relating to the long-term solvency of public debt, when expressed in terms of GDP ratio, states that the GDP growth rate has to be lower than the interest rate so that the discounted terminal period debt ratio converges to zero. This implies that in case of a positive initial public debt, the sum of the cumulated discounted future public surpluses should exceed the sum of the cumulated discounted future public deficits. However, if the rate of growth of GDP is higher than the interest rate, there would be reverse stabilising effect on the ratio of debt to GDP even if a sub-national government is accumulating primary deficit. However, it may not be possible to sustain high growth situation and/or maintain the positive growth-interest differential for all times to come; and a positive primary balance may become necessary to ensure sustainability of public debt and avoid Ponzi scheme.
III. Review of Literature
In the theoretical literature, the rationale for maintaining low/sustainable level of debt is attributed, among others, to the need to ensure sustainability of fiscal policy, provide fiscal space for undertaking counter-cyclical policy, absorbing contingent liabilities without threatening debt sustainability, reduce vulnerability to crises and optimize growth by reducing the risk of crowding out of private investment, while taking into account concerns relating to inter-generational equity and future spending needs. In the Indian context, there are several empirical studies, which have examined fiscal/debt sustainability of states (Table   1) . Overall, the empirical studies on debt sustainability at the state level in India indicate a mixed picture. While some of the studies point out that the debt position of states is unsustainable, others have drawn attention to the declining debt-GSDP ratios at the state level and attributed this improvement to the strong growth performance and the implementation of fiscal rules during [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] [2009] [2010] [2011] [2012] . It is held that a slowdown in growth momentum could pose risk to the achievement of envisaged gross fiscal deficit and debt-GSDP targets under the medium-term scenario.
IV. Need for Assessment of Debt Sustainability at the State level
Globally, sub-national governments (SNGs) have assumed importance in the wake of their increasing role in provision of various essential services while also catering to urban infrastructure requirements. In this process, their resource base has also expanded with growing dependence on borrowed funds. However, the borrowing limits of SNGs are, by and large, regulated by the upper tiers of government in countries with a federal system. In countries with 'golden rules' in place, borrowings are required to be authorised, and in some countries (France, Ireland and the UK), the Central government could directly restrict borrowings by lower levels of government. In Sweden, it is mandatory for SNGs to balance their budgets by year-end; in case of deficits, balance has to be restored in two years. Apart from the imposition of restrictions on borrowing limits, the practice of having explicit coordination agreements between different government tiers have also been observed.
In the Indian context, the starting point of the debt sustainability exercise is to examine whether the state governments really face hard budget constraint? Article 293 of the Indian Constitution stipulates that a state may not without the consent of the Government of India raise any loan if there is still outstanding any part of a loan which has been made to the state by the Government of India or by its predecessor Government, or in respect of which a guarantee has been given by the Government of India or by its predecessor Government. This implies that the state governments do not have unrestricted power to borrow as long as they are indebted to the Centre. In addition, states are also prohibited from borrowing abroad with the exception of loans from multilateral financial institutions intermediated by the Central government.
In addition to the restrictions under Article 293 of the Constitution of India, the state governments have gone ahead with the self-imposed restrictions through the enactment of FRBM Acts/FRLs. The implementation of a rule-based fiscal discipline mechanism under these enactments since the early 2000s has been marked by a gradual move towards sustainability of their fiscal and debt positions, with majority of the states achieving the FC-XIII targets as also their self-imposed targets. However, a few states continue to face fiscal stress and their debt positions remain an area of concern. Furthermore, notwithstanding strict monitoring of overall borrowing limits and adherence to various restrictions, the state governments have been able to raise additional 'off-budget' borrowings with guarantees through state-controlled Special Purpose Vehicles (SPVs) and/or state-owned public sector enterprises (SPSEs), which have in-built risks of various kinds. It is against this backdrop that the following Section presents the evolution of debt position of state governments beginning 1980-81.
V. Evolution of State Government Debt in India: Some Stylised Facts
The fiscal position of states in India, which had remained comfortable in the first three decades since independence, exhibited signs of fiscal stress since the mid-1980s. The 
Chart I: Key Fiscal Indicators of State Governments
Note: 1.Ratios pertaining to 'All States' are as percentage to GDP.
2. NSC and SC refer to non-special and special category states, respectively.
In recognition of the need for fiscal discipline, the state governments, however, adopted a rule-based fiscal framework through the enactment of FRBM Acts/FRLs which also included stipulation of ceilings on total liabilities and in some cases on debt-service liabilities (Goa, Jharkhand and Odisha). Karnataka was the first state to enact its FRBM Act in September 2002, followed by Kerala (2003 ), Tamil Nadu (2003 and Punjab (2004) . Other states also adopted these legislations to avail of the benefits under the incentive scheme Reflecting all these developments, the debt position of the state governments improved significantly in the recent period, with average debt-GDP ratio of 22.2 per cent during 2012-13 to 2015-16 as compared to around 31 per cent in the last decade and half. However, at a disaggregated level, the debt-GSDP ratio was higher than 30 per cent in Kerala, Punjab, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal while it was above 25 per cent in Bihar, Goa and Rajasthan in the latest period (Table 2) . Odisha recorded a remarkable improvement in its debt-GSDP ratio during the period 2004-05 to 2015-16. 
VI. Assessment of Debt Sustainability at the State Level in India
In the empirical literature, there are primarily two approaches to fiscal (debt) sustainability. The first approach basically looks at various indicators of the sustainability of fiscal policy (Miller 1983 , Buiter 1985 , 1987 , Blanchard 1990 , Buiter, Corsetti and Rubini 1993 while the second approach involves empirical evaluation or tests of government solvency (Hamilton and Glavin 1987 , Trehan and Walsh 1988 , Bohn 1998 . The empirical testing techniques include determination of sustainable (long-run and maximum sustainable) level of public debt based on a partial equilibrium framework, a model-based approach and signal approach to fiscal sustainability. Marini and Piergallini (2007) , however, suggest an integration of the results from these two approaches so as to provide additional information on the issue of government solvency. While indicators are said to be forward looking, tests are considered backward looking as they are based on historical data. It is the stability of the parameters of the primary surplus equation which in fact determines the usefulness of results derived from indicators or from tests in the assessment of the sustainability of public debt. It is held that "without a systematic break in policy, the predictions of tests are more reliable since the results of indicators are likely to reflect cyclical factors". This paper has used both indicator-based approach and empirical testing techniques for an assessment of debt sustainability at the state level.
VI.1:Indicator-based Assessment
Traditionally, debt sustainability analysis, under indicator-based assessment, takes into account credit-worthiness indicators (nominal debt stock/own current revenue ratio; present value of debt service/own current revenue ratio) and liquidity indicators (debt service/current revenue ratio and interest payments/current revenue ratio). These indicators broadly enable an assessment of the ability of a State government to service its interest payments and repay its debt as and when they become due through current and regular sources of revenues excluding temporary or incidental revenues as grants or capital revenue resulting from sale of assets. Alternatively, debt and debt-service indicators are monitored to assess relationship of existing debt to different types of expenditures or as ratios to various fiscal balances so as to gauge sustainability of both debt and fiscal situation.
An improvement in fiscal conditions creates fiscal space, and enhances debt repayment capacity, while worsening of fiscal conditions entails higher borrowings, adding to the debt burden. In certain situations, the improvement in debt-servicing conditions could also be policy-induced, as discussed in the earlier section. From an analytical point of view, both trends in various fiscal indicators as also characteristics of institutions matter for an assessment of debt sustainability at the state level. In addition, debt sustainability is also associated with a non-financial dimension about the capacity to plan, organise and implement policies, which may be both budget and debt-related.
An analysis based on various indicators of debt sustainability in different phases during the period 1981-82 to 2015-16 (Table 3) reveals that the rate of growth of debt of states at the aggregate level exceeded the nominal GDP growth rate during Phase I (1981 Phase I ( -82 to 1991 , Phase III (1997 -98 to 2003 and Phase V (2012 Phase V ( -13 to 2015 . However, the Domar stability condition that the real rate of interest on debt (i.e., effective interest rate adjusted for inflation) be lower than the real GDP growth was fulfilled in all the phases except in Phase III when the real rate of interest was almost equal to the real output growth.
Here, effective interest rate represents current interest payments as a per cent of outstanding liabilities of state governments in the previous year.
Both primary balance and primary revenue balance remained negative in all the phases, even as there was some improvement in primary revenue balance-GDP ratio in the last two phases. Interest payments (average), which had crossed one-fifth of revenue receipts (considered as a tolerable ratio of interest burden, Dholakia et al. 2004) during Phase III, declined to 16.5 per cent and 11.8 per cent of revenue receipts in Phase IV and Phase V, respectively. The trend in debt-GDP ratio of all states was influenced by the differential between the GDP growth and effective interest rate during the period under review (Chart II).
A state-wise position in respect of debt sustainability indicators for 17 non-special category states is presented in Table 4 . It may be seen that in all the states the rate of growth of GSDP was higher than the effective interest rate in the last two phases, even as the gap between the two narrowed down in Phase V (Table 4a) . Furthermore, the rate of growth of public debt turned out to be higher than the GSDP growth in several states in Phase V, which is a cause of concern (Table 4b ). The debt redemption pressure is also evident from the ratio of debt redemption (principal and interest payments) to total debt receipts, which shot up This is indicative of a smaller proportion of borrowed funds being available for productive uses by the state governments during the latter period.
In addition to the debt sustainability indicators as discussed above, it may also be appropriate to analyse debt profile linked vulnerability indicators viz., spread on state government debt, average maturity and ownership pattern of debt. These indicators provide an idea about liquidity and pricing risks associated with the level of debt and its composition. Higher yield on these securities vis-a-vis Central government securities is another attraction for long-term investors. The state-specific fiscal performance related risk factors are presumably not being factored in by the investors. However, this situation may not continue for long in case there is any deviation in the extant institutional arrangement for management of state government debt. 
VI.II:Econometric Framework for Assessment of Debt Sustainability at State Level
The fiscal/debt sustainability exercise, in the empirical literature, is extended beyond the simple indicator-based assessment to validate whether inter-temporal government budget constraint is satisfied. This entails test of stationarity properties of the government debt stock (in level and first difference), examination of the long-term relationship between government revenues and expenditures, between primary balances and debt, and between capital expenditure and public debt (Bhatt, 2011) . While confirmation of stationarity of government debt stock (in level and first difference) indicates statistical reversion towards mean value after temporary disturbances, the presence of cointegration between government revenues and expenditures reflects their co-movements and anchoring of fiscal imbalances.
VI.II.1 Inter-temporal Budget Constraint
In line with the empirical literature, we have made an attempt to test whether the fiscal policy stance of Indian states is sustainable, i.e., whether it satisfies the inter-temporal budget constraint. This test basically examines whether the past behaviour of state governments' revenues, expenditure and fiscal deficit could be continued indefinitely without prompting an adverse response from the lenders/investors from/to whom they borrow/sell securities to meet their resource gap.
The inter-temporal budget constraint, under the assumption that the funding of interest payments are not made from the new debt issuances (i.e., no-Ponzi scheme), imposes restrictions on the time series properties of government expenditure and revenues. This requires that government expenditure, revenues and debt stock are all stationary in the first differences. The stationarity property also restricts the extent of deviation of government expenditure from revenues over time. In case government expenditure and revenues are I (1) and cointegrated, then the error correction mechanism would push government finances towards the levels required by the inter-temporal budget constraint and ensure fiscal and debt sustainability in the long term (Cashin and Olekalns 2000) .
In this section, to start with, the stationarity properties of state government debt, revenues and expenditure have been tested in a panel data framework. After having done the stationarity test, we have examined whether a long-run equilibrium exists between government expenditure and revenues through panel cointegration tests. 
Data

Unit Root Analysis
As already mentioned, the stationarity properties of state government debt, revenues and expenditure are tested through panel unit root tests. Panel unit root tests are perceived to be more powerful than the unit root test applied on a single series. This is because the information content of the individual time series gets enhanced by that contained in the crosssection data within a panel set up (Ramirez, 2006) . There are different methods to carry out panel-based unit root tests. While the panel unit root methodology of Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) assumes that there is a common unit root process across the relevant cross sections, the tests suggested by Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) and Maddala and Wu (1999) assume individual unit root processes.
The results of panel unit root tests on relevant fiscal variables (debt, total revenues and total expenditure) are furnished in Table 5 . It may be seen that the tests (Levin, Lin and Chu; Im, Pesaran and Shin; and Maddala and Wu) failed to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root for government revenues and expenditure in level form. The tests, however, reject the null of a unit root in the first difference. The government debt, on the other hand, was found to be stationary both in level and first difference as per the Levin, Lin and Chu and Im, Pesaran and Shin tests. As per the Maddala and Wu test, however, the government debt turned out to be stationary only in the first difference. Overall, the results reveal that the three variables viz., debt, total revenues and total expenditure are stationary in first difference. 
Panel Cointegration
Since log R and log G were found to be I (1), in the next step, an attempt has been made to test, whether there exists a long-run equilibrium ( The results of the Pedroni test are also supported by Kao residual cointegration test, which rejects the null hypothesis of no cointegration at 1 per cent level (Table 7) . Thus, the overall findings of the panel cointegration tests reveal that the two series, government revenues and expenditure are cointegrated, indicating a long-term co-movement between them. The results suggest that the current fiscal policies of Indian states are sustainable in the long run. 
VI.II.2 Fiscal Policy Response Function
Bohn (1998), Adams et al. (2010) and Tiwari (2012) have analysed the response of primary surplus to variations in public debt for the purpose of assessment of fiscal policy/debt sustainability. In case primary surplus (relative to GDP) is observed to be a positive function of public debt (relative to GDP), it implies that rising debt ratios lead to higher primary surpluses relative to GDP, which is indicative of a tendency towards mean reversion and thus fiscal/debt sustainability. We have also used this approach in the following analysis.
Model Specification
The following equation is estimated in a panel data framework with annual data from In this equation, GSDP is the gross state domestic product; S is the primary balance to GSDP ratio; D is debt to GSDP ratio; GSDPGAP is the deviation of actual output from the trend; EXPGAP is the deviation of actual primary expenditure from the trend; ε is the error term. The business cycle variable GSDPGAP has been included to account for the fluctuations in revenues. The variable EXPGAP captures the impact of deviations of real primary expenditure from its long-term trend on the primary balance ratio. Here 'β' is the key coefficient, which measures the response of primary balance to debt. A value of this coefficient between zero and unity is consistent with a sustainable fiscal policy response to debt. A negative coefficient implies potentially destabilising response. In addition, allowance has been made in the estimations for the response of primary balance to GSDP ratio to be non-linear and allow it to vary with debt levels by introducing a square term of the debt to GSDP ratio as an additional explanatory variable.
Data
As in the earlier empirical exercise, the fiscal response function has also estimated for 20 states, for which data on all the relevant variables are available for the period 1980-81 to 2015-16. The data for Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh from 2000-01 also include that relating to Jharkhand, Uttarakhand and Chhattisgarh, respectively. Outstanding liabilities of each state government have been used to represent the level of their debt. GSDPGAP for each state has been worked out by extracting the deviation in real GSDP from its trend through HP-Filter. The deviation is expressed as a per cent of real GSDP. EXPGAP has been calculated in a similar manner using real primary expenditure of the state governments. The pair-wise correlation coefficients between the explanatory variables were found to be statistically insignificant, thus ruling out any multicollinearity problem.
Results
Before proceeding with the estimation, all the series were tested for stationarity.
Based on panel unit root tests involving common unit root process (LLC) as well as individual unit root process (IPS), the dependent variable and the explanatory variable series were found to be stationary, i.e., I (0). The results of the panel unit root tests are furnished in Table 8 . (2003) 2.* indicates the rejection of the null hypothesis of non-stationarity at 1 per cent level of significance 3. Automatic selection of lags through Schwarz Information Criteria (SIC).
All panel unit root tests are defined by Bartlett kernel and Newly West bandwidth
To decide on the panel models, i.e., whether it is a fixed effect (FE) model or a random effect (RE) model, Hausman test was conducted for each of the two model specifications (linear and non-linear). The summary results of the Hausman test are furnished in Appendix II. The results of the Hausman test for both the models indicate that there is a significant difference in the coefficients estimated by the FE and RE models. Therefore, the null hypothesis of correlated random effect is rejected and the alternative hypothesis that individual specific effect is correlated with the explanatory variables is accepted.
Accordingly, fixed effect model has been chosen for estimating the two model specifications indicated above.
The models have been estimated through generalised least square technique with cross section Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) with a correction for first order autoregressive error term. The models are adjusted for the heteroscedasticity with White cross-section standard errors and covariance method. The empirical results from the panel regression exercise are presented in Table 9 . In Model 1 (linear model), the coefficients of all the explanatory variables were found to be significant at one per cent level. Positive coefficient of D indicates that the primary balance of state governments increases in response to rising debt ratios. This implies that the primary fiscal balance in India responds in a stabilising manner to increases in debt. Positive coefficient of GSDPGAP implies that primary balance improves when GSDP is above the trend. The negative coefficient of EXPGAP, on the other hand, indicates that the primary balance declines when primary expenditure is above the trend. These findings are in line with a priori expectations. In the non-linear equation approach (Model 2), allowance was made for the possibility that the response of the primary balance to debt is better represented in terms of a quadratic function rather than a linear response function. The results suggest that the primary balance function has an inverted 'u' shape, implying that the adjustment parameter first rises and then falls.
VII. Going beyond the Conventional Debt Sustainability Analysis
In the empirical literature, several studies have gone beyond the conventional debt sustainability analysis in various ways. This has been done by extending the scope of conventional debt analysis (based on the inter-temporal budget constraint in a static environment) to account for fiscal and economic behaviour in response to shocks (sensitivity analysis), fiscal vulnerabilities (stress-testing exercise) and short-term refinancing risks. The interaction of key variables driving debt dynamics is also factored in debt sustainability exercises. There are other studies which have used a more comprehensive concept of debt, covering not only explicit liabilities but also contingent, implicit and off-budget liabilities fixed on annual incremental guarantees as ratio to GSDP or total revenue receipts (Appendix III). Apart from the differences across states in terms of guidelines relating to guarantees, there are also sharp differences when it comes to awareness about fiscal risk linked to issuance of these guarantees and the state level efforts to reduce outstanding guarantees as a policy initiative.
The guarantee commitments of state governments in respect of state public sector enterprises (SPSEs) have recently emerged as a major source of potential risk to fiscal and debt sustainability at the state level. While the need for issuance of guarantees to SPSEs arose after 1993-94, when the practice of allocation of a separate share in market borrowings to these enterprises was discontinued, it assumed further importance in the wake of declining budgetary support to these enterprises for meeting their capital requirements. As borrowing requirements of these entities increased, these were backed by issuance of guarantees in several states, resulting in an increase in explicit contingent liabilities of these states. This problem is more acute in those states, which have not enacted any law or framed any rules for fixing the ceiling on guarantees to be given by the state government. On the other hand, there are a few states (Odisha) which have exercised due precaution in putting in place rules to avoid the spill-over effect of these guarantees to State budgets.
The unbridled growth in guarantees issued to SPSEs, which have large outstanding debt and are also incurring losses, have increased vulnerability of these enterprises with fiscal implications for the state governments. This is evident from the data relating to outstanding debt and accumulated losses/ profit of SPSEs at end March 2015 (Table 10) . In some states, the outstanding debt of SPSEs is of much larger magnitude than outstanding guarantees issued to these undertakings. On top of this, many SPSEs have accumulated huge losses, which indicate their poor debt-servicing capacity entailing the risk of default in future. 
VIII: Conclusion
In this paper, the debt sustainability of state governments in India was assessed 
